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a bona fide doubt as to the union's majority.5 Furthermore, where the union's
majority status has been certified by the Board within the prior year, it cannot
be challenged by the employer, regardless of the union's present noncompliance . 6 Even after expiration of the year, a presumption of continuing majority
status exists. 67 Where an election is held without the participation of the noncomplying union, the ability to prevent rival organizations from obtaining a
majority in that contest 68 will protect the union against certification of others
for at least a year. 69 In a like manner, certification of rivals can be prevented
70
where the noncomplying union has a current contract with the employer.
Because of these circumstances, it would appear that the Section is least
effective where more powerful unions are involved. This seems anomalous since
Congress was presumably most concerned over the threat to commerce and national security inherent in the Communist domination of such unions.7' In
this respect it is significant that the rules worked out in the unfair labor practice cases help prevent loss of strength. On the other hand, such unions, because of their inability to appear on the ballot or achieve a union shop, have
suffered losses through the "raiding" tactics of rival complying organizations72
But even if the union is so weakened that it lacks the economic power to strike
for recognition, so long as it maintains a majority the demise of the Andrews
rule may discourage the employer from refusing to bargain.
THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE AND JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF ACTS
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.' is the first case interpreting and
testing the validity of a Maryland statute extending the area of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Section 19(d) of that statute provides that
6s John Deere Plow Co. of St. Louis, 82 N.L.R.B. 69 (1949); D. H. Holmes Co., 8i N.L.R.B.
753 (1949). "Whether in a particular case an employer is acting in good or bad faith, is of
course a question which of necessity must be determined in the light of all the relevant facts in
the case. Among the factors pertinent to a determination of the employer's motive at the time
of the refusal to bargain are any unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events,
and the lapse of time between the refusal and the unlawful conduct." Artcraft Hosiery Co.,
78 N.L.R.B. 333, 334 (X948).
66Shawnee Milling Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1266 (i949).
67 Dorsey Trailers, Inc., So N.L.R.B. 478 (1948).
68 The noncomplying union is permitted to campaign against its rival. Woodmark InduEtries, Inc., So N.L.R.B. 1105 (1948).
69 No election can be held within one year after a valid election has been conducted. Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, at § 9(c)(3), 6i Stat. I44 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A. § X59(c) (3)
(Supp., 195o).
70 Aluminum Co. of America, 85 N.L.R.B. 915 (i949). In the absence of a contract, however,
the noncomplying union has not even the standing to file objections to the conduct of the
election. Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361 (1948).
71See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Hartey, NLRB, op. cit. supra note 5 at 613.
72 Consult Levinson, op. cit. supra note s4 at ro87 et seq.
189 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Md., ig5o).
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"[e]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State by a resident
of this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this State on any
cause of action arising out of a contract made within this State or liability
incurred for acts done within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation
'
is doing or has done business in this State. 2
An agent of Reed Roller Bit Co. had advised plaintiff's employer that Bay
State Abrasive manufactured the best type of grinding wheel to use in conjunction with Reed Roller's pneumatic grinder. The wheel shattered in use, injuring plaintiff, who sued both corporations under Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act. Both defendants were served by a form of substituted service
upon the Maryland State Tax Commission, which in turn notified defendants
by registered mail. The case was removed to the United States District Court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship, and defendants moved to dismiss the
action, asserting that the court had no jurisdiction since defendants were both
foreign corporations not "doing business" within the state. The court ruled
only upon defendants' motions, and finding that neither defendant was "doing
business" in the state within the meaning of Article 23, § 119(C)4 which authorized jurisdiction on that basis, the court was forced to decide whether or
not the statute quoted gave jurisdiction.
A reasonable construction of the statute in question would indicate that it
seeks to establish jurisdiction over foreign corporations for certain isolated acts.
In an attempt to define these acts the court stated: "While application of...
section iig(d) when literally applied in some cases might infringe the due
process clause, I hesitate to reach the conclusion that there are not other situations in which its application may be consistent with due process."S These
"situations" were to be determined consistent with the approach in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.6 Quoting from the opinion in that case the court
said that "the foreign corporation's activities must be such as to 'establish
sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and
just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred
there.' "7
It was held to be irrelevant that both corporations completed about $15,ooo
worth of sales in Maryland per year, and that Reed Roller's agent, while not
authorized to do more than solicit orders, had been regularly accepting orders
2Md.

Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) art. 23, § i9(d) (Supp. 1947) (emphasis added). For

favorable comment on § i19(d) see Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts over Foreign
Corporations under the Act of 1937, 3 Md. L. Rev. 35 (1938).
3Md. Code Ann. (Flack, '939) art. 23, § ii(d) (Supp., i947) provides for such service
on corporations subject to the state's jurisdiction under § iIg.
4 Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) (Supp., 1947).
5Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D.C. Md., 195o).
6326 U.S. 31o (i945).
7 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654, 662 (D.C. Md., i95o).
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for at least a year and giving advice to prospective customers in Maryland as
to the utility and sufficiency of Reed Roller's product. But this agent had, in
Maryland, recommended to plaintiff's employer that he purchase a Reed
Roller Grinder and further, that he use a grinding wheel manufactured by Bay
State Abrasive Co., which wheel by shattering injured plaintiff. Although
plaintiff's employer actually purchased both grinder and wheel from an independent supplier, the acts of Reed Roller's agent in giving advice were judged
by the court to be within the ambit of the Maryland statute, and its application
did not violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States.
The court found that Bay State had made no contract, and had no transaction
within Maryland in relation to the alleged liability, and § ii 9 (d) was therefore
inapplicable by its terms. Bay State's motion to dismiss was granted, and Reed
Roller's overruled.
It does not seem unreasonable to subject foreign corporations to the jurisdiction envisaged in the Maryland statute, nor does there seem to be reason for
exempting natural persons from similar jurisdiction if attempted under appropriate legislation. It was once thought that states could not obtain jurisdiction
over nonresident natural persons by substituted service on the basis of their
having "done business" in the state. The Supreme Court said in Flexner v.
8
that the fictional "consent" theory could not be applied to individuals,
Farson'
since the state had no power to exclude individuals from doing business in the
state, as it had with respect to foreign corporations. But in Davidson v. Doherty,9 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld an Iowa statute giving jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual "doing business" within the state, basing its
opinion largely on the ground that a nonresident individual was subject to
"reasonable regulation." The United States Supreme Court upheld Iowa's
statute providing for substituted service in the similar case of Doherty v. Goodman, 0 but emphasized the fact that the nonresident defendant was in a business particularly subject to state regulation, the selling of investment securities.
Although there have been no Supreme Court cases directly on this point since
Doherty v. Goodman, states'have continued to subject to their jurisdiction defendants not resident or present, on the basis of having "done business" within
state boundaries." Mississippi and Arkansas have-statutes which not only seek
to give jurisdiction over individuals not resident or present within the state on
the basis of "doing business," but look toward jurisdiction over persons for
2
individual acts committed within the state.
8

248 U.S. 248 (1919).

Iowa 529, 241 N.W. 700 (1932).
294 U.S. 623 (1935).

9 214

142 F. 2d 740 (C.A. 5th, 1944); Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. ioio,
S.W. 2d 212 (1948); Davidson v. Doherty, 214 Iowa 529, 241 N.W. 7o0 (1932); Melvin
Pine & Co. V. McConnell, 273 App. Div. 218, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (ist Dep't, x948), aff'd 298
N.Y. 27, 8o N.E. 2d 137 (1948); Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 AtI. 527 (1934).
12Miss. Code Ann. (942) § 1437; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 27, § 340.

"Sugg v. Hendrix,
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It is suggested that the constitutional doctrine of the InternationalShoe'3
case in effect overrules Flexner v. Farson,'4 and is applicable to and would uphold not only statutes intending to give jurisdiction over natural persons not
resident or present in the state on the basis of "doing business," but also
statutes granting jurisdiction over such persons for individual acts within the
state. The language of the InternationalShoe case is not restricted to foreign
corporations, and as applied in the Johns case satisfies the safeguards necessary
to due process.
Jurisdiction similar to that in the Maryland statute under consideration has
been upheld in regard to both foreign corporations and natural persons. Even
before jurisdiction was extended over nonresident natural persons "doing
business" in a state, jurisdiction on the basis of doing a single, particular act
was upheld in connection with the nonresident motorist statutes. 8 These
statutes have been held to apply to foreign corporations. 6 Pennsylvania has a
statute which provides for personal service by registered mail on nonresidents
who have certain connections with real property located within the state,
abutting streets or sidewalks, in any civil action brought in Pennsylvania in
which such real property is involved.'7 Under this statute successful plaintiffs
would, of course, obtain judgments in personam. In Dubin v. Philadelphia8 a
Pennsylvania court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in an action
against a resident of New Jersey.
English courts, at their discretion, may assert jurisdiction over nonresidents
on the basis of the commission of certain specified acts, through the medium of
service outside of the jurisdiction. In the Common Law Procedure Act (1852)9
provision was made for service of the notice of writ of summons abroad, on the
basis of certain acts. However, this act was construed not to pertain to foreign
corporations.20 These provisions were superseded by the Rules of the Supreme
Court,"1 made under the authority of the Judicature Act (1875)

;22

and the new

Rules were held to apply nbt only to individuals not present or resident in England, but also to foreign corporations in Scott v. Royal Wax CandleCo., in 1876.23
Currently, foreign corporations as well as individuals not present or resident
1International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (I945).
'4 248 U.S. 248 (I99).
IsWuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
z6 Martin v. Fishbach Trucking Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (C.A. ist, ig5o). Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill.
309, 2oN.E. 2d592 (i959); Bischoff v. Schnepp, 139 N.Y. Misc. 293, 249 N.Y. Supp. 49 (N.Y.
City Ct., 1930).
17Pa. Stat. Ann. (1931) tit. 12 § 331.
X834 Pa. D. & C. 61 (C.P., i938), noted in 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. iig (1938).
19i5 & 16 Vict., c. 76 (1852).
2Ingate v. Le Commisione Del Lloyd Austrian, [I858] 4 C.B. (N.S.) 705.
" Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XI, rule 1 (1875).
"38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1875).
23[,876] 1 Q.B.D. 404, 34 L.T. 683.
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in England may be served abroad when, inter alia, the action is brought upon a
contract if (i) made within the jurisdiction, or (ii) made by or through an agent
trading or residing within the jurisdiction on behalf of a principal trading or
residing out of the jurisdiction, or (iii) by its terms to be governed by English
law, or (iv) is brought in respect of a breach committed within the jurisdiction,
of a contract wherever made.24 Additional situations in which such jurisdiction
may be asserted include actions founded upon a tort committed within the
jurisdiction,'5 or attempts to enjoin acts to be committed within the jurisdiction,'2 or for the inclusion of any person out of the jurisdiction, who is a necessary or proper party to an action properly brought against some person duly
served within the jurisdiction.27 To avoid working hardship upon defendants in
.these cases, the defense offoruin non conveniens is available to persons attempt8
ing to avoid the jurisdiction of the English courts.
In generalizing upon the English law on this subject, one writer has aptly
said: "A general right to compel foreign defendants to appear in England is not
asserted; so long as foreigners keep themselves free from English transactions,
they are not subject to the power of English courts; but it is regarded as fair and
reasonable to subject foreigners to substituted service and suit in the English
courts until their voluntary transactions affecting England are completed."29
24 Rule of the Supreme Court, Order XI, rule i(e) (1883), i Annual Practise too (1949).
For detailed explication see Dicey, Conflict of Laws 183 et seq. (6th ed., Morris, X949). Domiciliaries of Scotland and Ireland are in some cases exempt from these general provisions.
Service in England on corporations which have not registered the names of agents authorized
to receive service of summons, in causes not within the ambit of the rules enabling extraterritorial service, hinges upon "residence" in Great Britain. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co.
v. Actien-Gesellschaft, [1902] i K.B. 342 (C.A.), it was held that service upon defendant
corporation in England was valid, since defendant conducted a material part of its business
(viz., sales), at a fixed place of business (viz., a stall at the Crystal Palace), for a substantial
period of time (viz., nine days). Consult also Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik von Heyden, [IgII] 2 K.B. 516 (C.A.); Actiesselkabet Damskib "Hercules" v. Grand Trunk Pacific
Ry. Co., [X912] i K.B. 222 (C.A.). For further rules of jurisdiction over foreign defendants
see the Companies Act, ii & 12 Geo. VI, c. 38, §§ 4o6-16 (1948) and the Carriage by Air
Act, 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 36 (1932).
25 Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XI, rule i(ee), i Annual Practise ioi (1949).
26 Ibid., rule i (f). A recent United States example of the use of this basis for jurisdiction was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (i95o), commented upon in 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 382 (195o) after decision by the Virginia Court of Appeals, i88 Va. 877, 51 S.E. 2d 263 (1949). Travelers Health Ass'n, a nonprofit association incorporated in Nebraska with sole office in Omaha, carried on a health insurance business by
mail order. Defendants were given notice by registered mail of the State Corporation Commission's order to cease and desist further solicitations or sales of certificates to Virginia residents "through medium of any advertisement from within or from without the state, and/or
through the mails or otherwise, by intra- or interstate communication.., unless and until" it
had received authority in accordance with the state Blue Sky law. 339 U.S. 643, 646 (i95o).
27 Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XI, rule i(g) (1883).
28 Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [i9o6] i K.B. 141 (C.A.); followed in Egbert v. Short, [1907]

2 Ch. 2o5.
29 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business within a State,
L. Rev. 909, 926-27 (1934).

32 Mich.
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Similar rules are in effect in all other jurisdictions of the British Empire and
Commonwealth.
Roman law, under the doctrine of forum contractus, allowed a nonresident to
be sued where he had established a temporary seat of business and in some
cases, where he had contracted but one obligation.3° There was also a special
jurisdiction over persons based upon a delict committed within the jurisdiction,
theforum delicti.3"Forum contractusand forum delicti have received wide recognition in civil law countries.32
The disparity in the law concerning jurisdiction between civil law countries
and the United States may, perhaps, be adequately explained by the different
degrees to which they have been influenced by Roman law. But this does not
explain why England recognizes jurisdiction over foreign individuals and corporations on the basis of the doing of certain acts connected with the jurisdiction, while American courts recognize such basis for jurisdiction in only a few
specific situations. One hypothesis which might be advanced is that for British
subjects (except in Commonwealth nations) a foreign corporation means one
incorporated in a foreign country, and the British courts and House of Commons did not wish to force residents of Britain to prosecute actions against
nonresidents in courts where the law, procedure and language were unfamiliar,
and where it seemed reasonable to force nonresidents to defend in England
because the transaction sued upon was connected with England. American
plaintiffs would not have this difficulty in so great a degree, so that the need
for a similar basis of jurisdiction is not so pressing. Perhaps unexpressed notions
about the need for increased manufactures in the United States were responsible for the courts' hesitancy to subject to jurisdiction persons not resident or
present, or corporations away from their "homes," in states where they did not
carry on a really significant portion of their business activity. The opposite
course, if adopted, might conceivably have slowed the growth of business enterprise by increasing liability.
There are many policy matters to be considered in proposing that the law
of jurisdiction in the United States move in the direction shown by foreign law.
The doctrine of reciprocity has some application to this problem. If nonresident
corporations or individuals voluntarily come into states and engage in transactions with residents, the nonresident has the privilege of using that state's
courts to enforce whatever rights accrue to it.
States have a legitimate interest in protecting their citizens and administering their laws. Perhaps this can best be accomplished if a state is given jurisdiction over causes arising out of acts committed within or closely connected with
its territory. The opportunity for a resident of a state to prosecute within it
actions in personam against a nonresident where actual notice may easily be
given, seems to be neither less important nor more burdensome to the defendant
30 Westlake, Private International Law
31Ibid., at 230.

229

(6th ed., Bentwich,

32 Ibid.,

at 238.
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than the adjudication of interests in tangible goods, wherein states may cut off
nonresidents' interests with no actual notification.33 Furthermore, witnesses to
transactions between nonresidents and residents are more likely to live in the
state which the nonresident entered.
It would be difficult for corporations or individuals to defend in distant jurisdictions where they might have no agents, office, or other organization. But if
the Maryland type of jurisdiction were to be sustained, the courts would still
retain their discretionary power on pleas of forum non conveniens to prevent
hardship on nonresident defendants. 34 This basis for jurisdiction over nonresidents might increase their costs of defense, for it can be foreseen that a goodsized, active corporation or other business would possibly be forced to defend
many claims in various jurisdictions. The hardship would certainly not be
greater, however, than that which arises from the well-established right to sue
a corporation doing business in the forum upon causes of action which are totally
unconnected with it. In addition, it seems reasonable to require the public to
share the social cost 3s of enterprise by paying higher prices for the goods and
6
services produced by businesses operating across state boundaries.3
This system of jurisdiction would leave unsolved the problem of protecting
nonresidents from plaintiffs who obtain default judgments on unfounded
claims, which the nonresident considers not worthy of defending. It does not
resolve the difficulty of the successful plaintiff who finds that the defendant
has no property within the jurisdiction. But it probably is simpler and less expensive for such plaintiffs to enforce judgments in another jurisdiction than it
is to travel to other jurisdictions to try their cases upon the merits.
In view of the large volume of enterprise carried on across state boundaries
the future may see increasing state jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
under statutes similar to the Maryland statute construed in Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Products Co., consistent, of course, with the constitutional doctrine set
7
out in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.3
ACCESS PROBLEMS IN STRATIFIED ESTATE.
Division of the earth's subsurface into separate strata of ownership has
raised special problems in the law of property. One type of controversy results
33 Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Security Savings Bank v.
California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
34 In Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (i944), cert. denied 325
U.S. 866 (1945), the court described forum non conveniens as being an equitable rule embracing
the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction which it has over a cause
of action where it believes that the action maybe more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.
35Social cost being the cost of adjudicating claims between residents and enterprises resident in distant jurisdictions.
36Adopting in part the rationale given by Justice Douglas for the existence in our law of
vicarious liability without fault in his article Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk,
38 Yale L.J. 584 (1929).
37 326 U.S. 31o (1945).

